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Abstract 
 
Different types of policies are affected by different contextual conditions and carry with 
them different possibilities for implementation. Studies of implementation processes 
must therefore take as its point of departure the context attached to specific policies. In 
this article we present an alternative approach for how to analyse the implementation of 
public policies characterized by high politics and a ‘wicked’ problem structure (e.g. 
active labour market policies, curative social care, housing policies for the homeless and 
educational policies providing equal advancement of different socio-economic groups). 
In addition we develop an analytical perspective in which evaluation of implementation 
processes can both assist political decision-making and contribute to public discourse. 
The aim of our approach is to identify implemented policy content (actual policy 
outcome1) by evaluating different kinds of indicators. The process involves identifying 
dominant policy arguments, constructing analytical dimensions of possible 
developments in policy content and characterising implemented policy along these 
dimensions.2 The policy content may then be contrasted with different types of 
evaluation criteria, also including higher order criteria. The application of the model is 
illustrated by a case of implementation of municipal labour market policy in Denmark.3    
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1. Introduction 
 
The implementation literature has often been marked by disappointment over the 
current lack of a consistent and general theory of implementation and the lack of 
cumulative progress in implementation studies (cf. Hill and Hupe 2002; John 1998; 
Lester and Googin 1998; O´Toole 1986). There are at least three explanations for this 
pessimistic assessment of the future of implementation research:  
 
First, the strong focus on developing general theory and analytical models on 
implementation seem in a paradoxical way to have neglected the Laswellian call for 
contextuality (Lasswell 1956, 1970) and the obvious fact that different policies imply 
different types of implementation (cf. Matland 1995). General implementation theories 
and models will therefore run into methodological problems of validity as they neglect 
and thereby disconnect contextual conditions and policy characteristics. In our view 
general theories and models are not possible and that the state of art in implementation 
studies should not be judged according to this criterion. Instead we argue that what is 
needed is approaches that is able to differentiate between types of policies.  
 
Second, seminal pieces of scholarly work on implementation sprang out of disillusion 
with the lacking or insufficient outcomes of even the best-planned policies and 
pessimism about what governments can do (e.g. Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; 
Mazmaniman and Sabatier 1983) and could rightfully be called ‘pathological misery 
research’ (Rothstein 1998). In measuring implementation ‘success’ from single-
programme case studies by comparing achievements with official expectations, 
numerous ‘implementation failures’ were reported often without emphasising the 
specific, contextual conditions and complexity affecting the particular implementation 
process. Implementation ‘gaps’ and implementation ‘deficits’ were explained with 
reference the internal dynamics of the process like wasted resources, unforeseen side-
effects, unclear political objectives, inappropriate organisational forms etc. However, 
the character of the specific problem in question and the existence of ideological 
differences as well as political interests were not paid much attention. Moreover, the 
selection of policies to investigate may also be biased as the literature demonstrate a 
marked preference for studying programmes that are the most difficult to implement 
(that requires a decentralised implementation structure and represent a high level of 
ambition in relation to human processing of target-groups). Thus, implementation 
research aiming at finding out ‘what went wrong’ would miss the point. A more realistic 
goal of research would be ‘what happened’4, i.e. charting out the complexities of the 
implemented policy content. A ‘gap’ between political objectives and implemented 
policy outcomes are a natural consequence of these types of policies and the aim must 
instead be to collect knowledge on realised policy outcome. Subsequent assessment of 
implemented policy outcome must then be complemented with other equally valid 
evaluation criteria than explicit policy objectives.  
 
This lead us to the third explanation of the current state of affairs in implementation 
research, i.e. how to assess and evaluate the implementation process. There is 
disagreement in the literature on whether assessments of the outcome of the 
implementation process – that to a certain extent will always be normative – should be 
separated from or integrated in the empirical analysis. And what role the researcher 
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should take in this respect; contribute to political problems solutions or contribute to 
public discourse? We argue that these roles are not mutually exclusive since different 
roles and approaches can be handled at the same time. We apply an interpretative 
approach, i.e. an acknowledgement that the application of different ‘lenses’ and 
perspectives will emphasise different causal explanations for and consequences of the 
implementation process (cf. Allison 1971; Elmore 1978; Morgan 1986; Parsons 1995). 
We also suggest using normative based evaluation criteria like appropriateness of public 
policies and to contribute to public discourse. We nonetheless attempt to separate 
empirical analysis from normative judgements by first conducting an empirical analysis 
of implemented policy outcome and then holding this outcome up against different 
normative evaluation criteria.  
 
In what follows we develop our analytical approach that will contribute to shed light on 
some of the ‘blind spots’ in the implementation literature emphasised above. Two 
questions are especially pertinent:  
 
1) How do we contextually analyse implementation processes of public policies 
characterised by a ‘wicked’ problem structure, intense political conflict, high 
level of ambition for change of target group behaviour when these policies are 
also implemented in a decentralised structure with numerous actors involved?  
2) How do we evaluate implementation processes that both assist political 
decision-making processes and contribute to public discourse? 
 
 
2. An analytical approach for studying the implementation process 
 
Reflecting upon the limitations and problems inherent in traditional studies of 
implementation processes, we propose an analytical approach that focuses on 
identifying the policy content realized in the implementation, where one operates with 
an analytical understanding of interdependence between policy content, politics and 
administration/organisation. An underlying assumption is a rejection of the alleged 
universal applicability of general models of policy and implementation processes. We 
claim – as exemplified by the case of implementation of municipal activation policies in 
the next section – that the approach must be adaptable to and developed in close 
association with the relevant context. Different types of policies and organisations 
produce different conditions for implementation, which need to be taken into account. 
Application of general analytical models is not suited to the variation in structures, 
processes and policy content that exist among different political systems and sectors. 
Policy developments are intimately related to the context in which they emerge. “For 
implementation theory and research this means that contextualisation is important: 
Implementation is always connected to specific policies as particular responses to 
specific problems in society” (Hill and Hupe 2002, 5). An analysis of implemented 
policy content must therefore also take into account the context in which policy 
develops and in which it is implemented. 
 
It also means that we prioritise explaining ’what happens-and why’ over the task of 
affecting ’what happens’ and ‘whether implementers comply with legislation’ (cf. 
Ripley and Franklin 1982, 10). Our argument is that perfect implementation is 
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unattainable (Hogwood and Gunn 1984, p198) and that implementation deficits will 
always occur. That is, we operate with an understanding of implementation-deficits as 
natural. Our approach acknowledge that in an analytical sense, implementation follows 
political decision-making, but that policy formation to a great extend also takes place in 
the implementation phase. Furthermore, it is a special characteristic of this approach 
that it takes its point of departure in empirical analysis as a background for subsequent 
normative judgement and evaluation.  
 
The primary aim of our approach is thus to map out the implemented policy content. 
This is accomplished by, first, identifying prevailing policy arguments dealing with 
certain problems within the chosen policy field or policy. This identification process 
may often involve a historical-institutional perspective on decision-making processes. 
Presuming that the implementation process is flexible and that variation within the field 
is great, the aim is to find dimensions of possible policy outcome along which the 
analysis of implementation processes can be structured5. The second step is to carry out 
an empirical analysis of the implementation process by studying different types of 
indicators (administrative/organisational, policy and politics) of how the policy in 
question has evolved. In a third phase, these analytical findings on implemented policy 
outcome are compared to prevailing policy arguments identified in the first step. 
Finally, this comparison may be used for different types of normative judgement and 
evaluation. Different types of evaluation criteria may be applied in this final phase and 
thus explicitly assist both political decision-making processes and contribute to public 
discourse. The four phases are illustrated in the model below  
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Figure 1. An analytical approach for analysing implementation processes: 
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This analytical approach was originally developed in order to analyse implementation of 
activation policies in Danish municipalities (cf. Larsen et. al 2001; Bredgaard et. al 
2002). However, we suggest that it might be applicable to a broader field of policies and 
policy evaluation. It seems particularly suitable for analysing implementation of public 
welfare-policies (e.g. active labour market policies, curative social care, housing 
policies for the homeless and educational policies providing equal advancement of 
different socio-economic groups). Such public policies seek to influence behaviour 
(human-processing) in a dynamic process. However, they operate in a context where the 
state of knowledge about what works is uncertain (uncertain and unclear policy theory) 
and where there exist great variations in the fields (cf. Rothstein 1998, 73ff.). Compared 
to the regulation of static conditions it is generally agreed that these policies are the 
most complicated to implement. Another element characterising these policies is that 
the problem structure is often ‘wicked’ (Harmon and Mayer 1986)6 and that political 
conflicts abound, often leading to policies with strong symbolic and legitimising 
elements (Edelman 1971, 1977). 
 
To present more of the underlying assumptions and the use of the analytical perspective, 
we begin by describing our understanding of the policy formulation process in which 
possible policy outcome is identified in relation to predominant policy arguments.  
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Analysis of policy formation - defining possible policy-alternatives based on 
prevailing arguments 
 
The implementation perspective focuses on what happens after policy formulation and 
decisions. It presumes that there is ‘something’ to implement and carry out. This 
dividing line between policy formulation and policy implementation, however, is not 
identical to the dividing line between politics and administration. Implementation is not 
just a new or different label for public administration, it is in itself a phase in which 
policies are substantially defined and changed: “policy is made as it is being 
administered and administered as it is being made” (Anderson 1975, 79). 
Implementation is thus an important element in the political decision-making process 
and a continuation of the political process. Nevertheless, we must stress that the 
implementation process is a specific political process that needs to be kept analytically 
separate from policy formulation processes. Implementation takes place in another 
political arena and under different conditions. This ‘something’ that must be 
implemented often consists of political decisions – or at least explicit political intentions 
– that legitimise a given policy and defines a central part of the framework for 
implementation. Political intentions and administrative guidelines have a more or less 
rationalised core of notions about problems and methods of problem solution. 
Depending on the character of these notions, there are wide or narrow frames for 
interpreting implementation processes concerning what should be the ‘correct’ and 
‘rational’ content of policy. Also frames around actors and implementing agents are set 
and they define the important and legitimate actors in the process and what type of 
knowledge and information that should count as expertise. By implication there does 
not exist a total free choice of actions in the implementation process. 
 
In identifying the dynamics of implemented policy content, the implementation 
perspective may seem rather inadequate. Basically ‘something’ needs to be 
implemented, but this ‘something’ is analytically difficult to define. The conventional 
‘top down’ approach to this problem is to begin with governmental programs, executive 
orders and official announcements. The characterisation of policy content will then 
contrast explicit policy objectives with actual policy outcome, often concluding that 
there is substantial disagreement due to implementation failure or wrong design. The 
conventional approach to analysing implementation of these types of public policies, 
however, reveals a number of analytical limitations. The most important limitation is 
that the policy objectives themselves are seldom clear, which makes it difficult to 
match their degree of realisation with an implementation outcome. The ambiguity and 
complexity of political objectives arises from a number of dynamics in the political 
decision-making process, which are worth mentioning: 
 
(1) Political decision-makers do not always know what they want. They may not know 
the final goal and intention of their efforts, or the political decision-making process 
may compel them to negotiate their way around to a compromise in order to 
achieve a consensus. Both situations provide the opportunity for several 
interpretations of the actual goals and content of a policy. 
 
(2) The problem situation may be unclear and difficult to structure, a chronic feature of 
most public welfare policies. Political decision-makers do not know what to do due 
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to lacking or insufficient knowledge about the type and causes of the problem at 
hand or insufficient knowledge on which types of public programs might alleviate 
these problems, i.e. they lack a clear and consistent policy theory (Rothstein 1998, 
74). This is often the situation when it comes to solving ‘wicked problems’. They 
are not clearly defined and difficult to isolate from other problems. This complexity 
is often a fundamental condition in implementation and needs to be addressed in the 
process of policy analysis.  
 
(3) The complexity and ambiguity of political objectives also stem from the high level 
of political ambitions of intervention. To adapt policies to local and individual 
circumstances requires wide latitude for action on the part of implementing agents. 
It then becomes a question of designing public policies so that implementing agents 
may accommodate uncertainty and the need for flexibility in the operational field 
(Rothstein 1998, 76) and which can respond to problems that vary among locations, 
that are dynamic and difficult to solve (Dalsgaard and Lassen 1997). From this 
perspective, unclear objectives and uncertain causal theories become an advantage 
in implementation, in so far as interventions can be flexibly adjusted to specific 
individual and local conditions. There is an additional aspect of unclear and 
ambiguous objectives, in that potential conflict and resistance from implementing 
agents may be reduced. Even if political decision-makers know what they want and 
how to do it, it might be a deliberate political strategy to formulate vague and 
unclear objectives in order to avoid opposition (Offerdal 2000). A traditional 
evaluation of explicit policy objectives would then miss the point.    
       
(4) Numerous programmes and policies can have explicit objectives and intentions that 
take on a symbolic and legitimising character. The most important motive for 
launching new policies should then be found elsewhere than in ambitions to solve 
specific problems. Political decision-makers might want to demonstrate resolve in 
an area where they are in reality powerless or where the costs of actually addressing 
the problem are considered too high. This implies that we cannot automatically 
assume a rational and intentional relationship between prevailing policy arguments 
and policy processes. 
 
In mapping out the policy content of such public policies, several factors make it 
inadequate to focus on the gap between formulated policy objectives and their extent of 
realisation.  We therefore find the traditional ‘top down’ approach to implementation 
and evaluation studies inadequate. It tends to ignore or rationalise the ambiguities and 
complexities of the policy process stemming from wicked problems, unclear policy 
theories, high level of policy ambition, political conflicts and the legitimising function 
of politics. All these conditions are integral elements of the policy process that cannot 
and should not be assumed away. On the contrary, they are starting points by which we 
compare and evaluate policy arguments. 
 
That brings us to the first step in the model (cf. figure 1 above), i.e. identifying 
prevailing policy arguments and problem definitions. Policy objectives and intentions 
should not be ignored, of course, but they need to be supplemented with other equally 
relevant sources. Different (and sometimes opposing) notions of problem character and 
magnitude, causal relations, preferred programmes and instruments can often be 
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identified and are influenced by ideology and actor interests. Prevailing policy 
arguments and problem definitions may also emanate from actors other than elected 
politicians (e.g. the social partners, powerful interest organisations, the media, etc.). 
The task of the policy analyst is to ‘wash out’ the different policy arguments and 
problem definitions by studying agenda-setting and policy formulation processes. We 
may then begin the implementation analysis (which we exemplify in the next section 
with the case of municipal labour market policy in Denmark) to be followed by a 
characterisation of the implemented policy content. 
 
Why map out the implemented policy-content?     
 
It is necessary and relevant to provide a characterisation of the implemented policy for 
three reasons. First, establishing a relationship between policy choices and policy 
outcomes presupposes a characterisation of implemented policy. This is necessary in 
order to avoid logical fallacies equating input (political causalities, explicit objectives 
and decisions) with outcome (policy outcome and impact). Otherwise, we fall into the 
trap of much conventional implementation research by only unmasking implementation 
gaps, implementation deficits and implementation failures (cf. Hill and Hupe 2002, 
Rothstein 1998, 62). By characterising implemented policy we also avoid generalising 
‘best practice’ from apparently successful implementation not necessarily related to 
explicit policy objectives. Second, characterisation of implemented policy content may 
be an important source of information for political decision-makers and may contribute 
to public discourse. Knowledge of implemented policy content is often more important 
than narrow changes of legislation and explicit government policy objectives. Third, an 
ambition to explore and map out implemented policy surpasses traditional questions 
posed in the implementation literature, i.e. whether or not the researcher or analyst 
considers normative judgement to be separate from or integrated in the empirical 
analysis (Hill and Hupe 2002, 10). In our approach, we conduct an inquiry in which 
empirical analysis has an exploratory character. Only subsequently empirical findings 
can be held up against normative judgements and evaluation. 
 
The evaluation perspective      
 
Our approach thereby improves possibilities for making research decisions explicit and 
for justifying epistemological stances when conducting implementation research, which 
has exactly been the critique of interpretative views on implementation that tend to 
confuse normative judgements and empirical findings (cf. Hill and Hupe 2002). We 
should stress that normative judgements are not illegitimate or unscientific; on the 
contrary, they are an essential element of implementation analysis. However, the 
benefits of moving from empirical findings on implemented policy content towards 
evaluation based on explicit normative criteria are obvious. The normative perspective 
is linked up to implemented policy and not to the policy goals or arguments. This 
generates an additional benefit (in our experiences) in the form of better possibilities to 
subsequently enter into dialogue with politicians and stakeholders regarding the results. 
Depending on the criteria one selects in the final analysis (cf. figure 1), the evaluation 
perspective may include both first-order and second-order evaluation (Fischer 1995). 
‘First order’ evaluation includes two research questions: (1) does the program 
empirically fulfil its explicit objectives? And (2) are political objectives relevant to the 
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problem situation? In ’second order’ evaluation the perspective is widened to include 
societal evaluation criteria, i.e. (1) whether the political objectives have instrumental 
value for society? And (2) whether fundamental ideals organising the accepted societal 
order gives a basis for legitimate solutions to opposing views and interests? In moving 
from empirical findings to normative judgement, it becomes possible to identify what 
happened (which objectives were achieved) and why (the causal connections) and 
thereby connect the respective advantages of implementation and evaluation analysis.     
 
 
3. Applying the approach: the case of municipal activation policy in 
Denmark  
 
A case of implementation of municipal activation policy in Denmark can illustrate how 
our approach can be applied for empirical use. We begin by identifying prevailing 
policy arguments for the introduction of the ‘active-line’ in municipal labour market 
policy. Acknowledging the complexity and ambiguity of activation policy makes it 
necessary to construct analytical dimensions for municipal implementation of policy 
content. 7 
 
Identifying prevailing policy arguments for the ‘active-line’ (step 1) 
 
Labour market policy discussions in Denmark in the late 1980s and early 1990s were 
framed around the question of ‘structural problems’ and especially the negative 
consequences of passive and generous welfare state support (Ministry of Labour 1989; 
Zeuthen Commission 1992; Social Commission 1993). In 1990, the Ministry of Social 
Affairs introduced the ‘active-line’ or ‘activation’ as a new policy concept in 
unemployment policy (i.e., the quid-pro-quo principle). Activation was inspired by 
workfare-principles (Katz 1989; Mead 1992) in so far as disciplining policy elements 
were accorded higher priority; unemployed persons were now required to participate in 
active programmes in order to maintain benefits. It was, nonetheless, workfare in a 
special Danish variant, by which the unemployed were also re-qualified (human capital 
rather than work-first approach) and were granted certain rights (i.e. empowerment 
rather than punishment) (Larsen 2002; Torfing 1999, 2000). The level of ambition of 
labour market policy was clearly raised. The ‘active-line’ was extended throughout the 
1990s and now covers each and every unemployed person despite individual problem 
characteristics: Everyone must be active! We have identified four prevailing policy 
arguments for this ‘active-line’:  
 
(1) Reduction of passive expenses for income support: Ever increasing social 
expenditures were seen as being in conflict with the tax-paying willingness of the 
hard-working population. Expenditures could be reduced by both social disciplining 
strategies (tougher availability criteria, quid-pro-quo, reduced unemployment 
benefit period etc.) and by social integration strategies (e.g. re-integration into the 
ordinary labour market by human capital investments and individual action plans).  
 
(2) Political consensus on the structural problems of the labour market: Worries were 
mounting that allocation problems in matching labour supply and demand would 
cause inflation, wage drift and diminish international competitiveness further 
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aggravating macro-economic problems. This argument led to the formulation of two 
main problem definitions and solutions. First, a neo-classical inspired approach 
emphasising economic incentives to make ‘work pay’ (OECD 1994, 1995; Pedersen 
and Smith 1995; Smith 1998; Jensen 1999). Remedies to solve the problem involves 
greater wage spread (e.g. lower introduction wages), lower benefit levels or reduced 
length of the unemployment benefit period, work-for-benefits, stricter availability 
and mobility criteria and tougher sanctions. We label this approach the ‘social 
disciplining strategy’.8 Second, the interventionist approach defines the 
unemployment problem as one of insufficient human and social capital. This 
strategy aims at re-qualifying and socially integrating the unemployed by flexible, 
needs-oriented activation and individual action plans. The role of the public sector is 
to find societal solutions to individual problems and not to reduce society’s role. 
Hence, the social integration strategy sustains the traditions of the universal welfare 
state while attempting to activate and reorient interventions towards the ordinary 
labour market.  
 
(3) Avoiding paternalism and clientelism in encounters between individual unemployed 
and the unemployment system. This policy argument combines various elements: 
the assumption that the responsibilities of civil networks (family, neighbours and 
friends) disappear as public state responsibilities for the fate of the individual 
increases (state colonisation); that the individual is deprived of individual 
responsibility (paternalism); and the claim that the availability of generous public 
welfare support in itself leads to increased consumption hereof (welfare dependency 
and clientelism). Demanding the unemployed person’s participation in activation in 
return for unemployment benefits (quid-pro-quo) and stressing the individual’s 
obligations, as a help-to-self-help became the proposed political solutions towards 
these problems.  
 
(4) Finally, increasing attention was given to the link between social problems and 
labour market participation. Political decision-makers realised that lack of labour 
market attachment not only implies economic losses for the individual but also has 
severe social consequences for the individual and the society. Work is now 
increasingly seen as a panacea to problems of social exclusion, isolation and a 
whole range of other social and individual problems.                         
 
Traditional state-driven and unconditional unemployment policies could not do the trick 
any longer. Problems emerged especially with those unemployed who deliberately 
‘misused’ the passive welfare support system to lead an alternative life outside the 
labour market (lacking work commitment) and with those long-term unemployed, who 
after several years outside the labour market, had lost their qualifications (work ability 
and availability). Interpretations of the magnitude and character of these problems 
differed with ideological and political convictions, of course, but almost everyone could 
agree upon the solution: Active labour market policy and activation!      
 
These four policy arguments illustrate the ambiguity and complexity of the ‘active-line’. 
The attempt to shift from passive and (largely) unconditional welfare provision towards 
active and interventionist employment policy thus contains numerous and also partly 
opposing political intentions and policy objectives. Taking into account the fact that 
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implementation of policy objectives occurs in a decentralised implementation process 
makes it relevant to study various implemented policy contents. We therefore need to 
construct a range of analytical dimensions that can capture the diversity of ways in 
which policies are implemented by municipal authorities.  
 
Analytical dimensions in the analysis of policy content 
 
Our frame of reference for constructing analytical dimensions is the policy intentions 
and objectives identified in the four policy arguments above and not the actual policy 
implementation process. Within the ‘active-line’, we distinguish between the strategies 
of social disciplining and social integration, in so far as they reflect opposing problem 
and policy definitions. The disciplining strategy defines the problem of unemployment 
as an individual problem of inadequate economic incentives to ‘make work pay’ 
because of generous welfare state support. Generosity creates welfare dependency and 
problems of work commitment and motivation. Reintegration into the labour market is 
ensured by demanding work in return for benefits, stressing individual obligations for 
economic self-sufficiency and applying tough sanctions in case of non-compliance. The 
social integration strategy defines the unemployment problem as a result of lacking or 
insufficient qualifications and competencies. Needs-oriented activation will ensure a 
match between individual needs and motivation on the one hand and local labour 
market requirements on the other. The final objective is nonetheless the same as in the 
disciplining strategy, i.e. economic self-sufficiency via labour market integration. Only 
in the ‘passive-line’, which has been de-legitimised and partially abandoned, there no 
demands in return for social assistance benefits, since the objective is not labour market 
integration but rather social security and equality. The last strategy we label the social 
compensation strategy.  
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Figure 2. Analytical dimensions: Policy alternatives and strategies 
 
 Active-line Passive-line 
 Social 
disciplining 
Social 
integration 
Social  
compensation 
Problem Insufficient economic 
incentives to take  
and seek jobs 
Insufficient 
competencies and 
qualifications  
to achieve a job 
Insufficient income 
support 
Instruments Work obligations and 
demands 
Needs-oriented 
(re)qualification 
Income compensation 
Incentives for 
behavioural 
change 
Extrinsic motivation 
(sanctions) 
Intrinsic motivation 
(help-to-self-help) 
None 
Orientation of 
problem 
solution 
Ordinary labour market Ordinary labour market 
and social orientation 
Social orientation 
Welfare state 
contract 
Conditional 
(work obligation) 
 
“Something-for-
something” 
Conditional 
(employability) 
 
“Something-for-
something” 
Unconditional in 
relation to work 
obligation and 
employability 
“Something-for-
nothing” 
Partial objective Work first Improve employability Improve life quality 
Final objective Self-sufficiency Social security and 
equality 
 
The underlying assumption of the figure is that a general movement in line with official 
policy objectives can be identified in municipal implementation. This would imply a 
shift from universal and partly unconditional social compensation towards the active-
line and especially with increasing elements of compulsion, sanctions and demands, i.e. 
from welfare towards workfare (cf. e.g. Jessop 1993; Torfing 1999, 2000; Peck 2002). 
In practice, the strategies are not necessarily contradictory, nor even mutually exclusive. 
Disciplining elements such as the work obligation and restrictive sanctions can coexist 
with social integration through needs-oriented activation. In the empirical 
implementation analysis following below, our foremost objective is to study the 
balancing of the social disciplining and social integrative strategies in the concrete local 
implementation of policy objectives and intentions. Thereby it is possible to identify the 
implemented policy content. 
  
Indicators for the analysis of implemented policy content (step 2) 
 
As indicated in figure 1, we operate with different types of indicators in order to 
describe the implemented policy content. These are administrative/organisational, 
policy and politics indicators, which we assume are interdependent.  
 
In the case of administrative or organisational indicators, our assumption is that 
choices of policy-alternatives and strategies influence perceptions of the operative 
conditions, measures and instruments applied. The means of organising the effort is 
therefore seen as linked to the development of the policy content. For instance, our 
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analysis assumes that a local activation policy with a high level of ambition for policy 
adoption in which problem solutions are seen as adaptable and individualised would 
imply broad policy frames and wide possibilities for local priorities and discretion in 
implementation processes. A social disciplining strategy, on the other hand, would 
imply stricter policy frameworks and more standardised implementation.  
 
Within these frames, there is room for different types of municipal policy formulation 
and implementation processes. The types of municipal activation policies can be 
distinguished as to whether the problem character is perceived as dynamic or static 
(Perrow 1986; Rothstein 1998, 79). Dynamic conditions call for a perception of tasks as 
varied and instruments as adaptable, while a perception of conditions as static, points to 
tasks as uniform and instruments as standardized  
 
Figure 3. Perceptions of problem character, tasks and instruments. 
 Static problem character Dynamic problem character 
Operative tasks Uniform Varied 
Instruments Standardised Adaptable 
 
The dimensions of policy content and perceptions of operative conditions must then be 
empirically compared to specific policy and implementation processes. This would 
imply that a perception of operative measures and instruments as requiring adaptability 
and flexibility would drive policy content towards the socially integrative strategy and 
vice versa. 
 
However, the converse may also be true; that existing intra- and inter-organisational 
relations can in themselves influence policy developments during implementation. It is 
thus an important point that new policies seldom are implemented in new organisational 
structures. In the case of activation, the policy shifts towards more interventionist, 
active policies are implemented within existing municipal organisational structures that 
have a more traditional welfare orientation (i.e. by focusing on solving the individuals 
social problems, rather than stressing the importance of work or activation). And 
general administrative policy developments can also influence local municipal 
organisation, and thereby policy developments. Here we have focused especially on the 
fact that municipal organisation is being challenged by New Public Management (NPM) 
reforms: decentralisation, management-by-objectives, contracting out, competition 
within government, consumer orientation, etc. Public authorities are expected to 
compete and co-operate with other private, public and non-profit organisations involved 
in the same tasks (Mosley and Sol 2001). In intra-organisational terms, it means a 
distinction between traditional and modern organisation  
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Figure 4. Municipal principles of organisation 
 Traditional organisation Modern organisation 
Principle of political control Regulations and case 
management 
Management-by-objectives 
Principle of accountability Professional norms 
Input orientation 
Performance results and 
control 
Output orientation 
Preferred qualifications of 
staff  
General competencies Specialised competencies 
 
  
In inter-organisational terms our analysis focus on whether especially private enterprises 
are involved in municipal labour market policy (market orientation) and the nature of 
network and co-operation with other external partners (e.g. the social partners, the 
public employment service, educational institutions). We assume that tendencies toward 
municipal adoption of modern forms of organisation will push the policy in the 
direction of social disciplining, while more traditional organisations correspond to 
social integration.  
 
We deal with indicators, i.e. operationalised indications of the categories in the 
analytical schema presented above. The various dimensions listed above show how 
intra- and inter-organisational ideas may be linked to a specific policy outcome. These 
ideas may be viewed as normative frameworks of orientation for the various actors in 
the implementation process. However, the extent to which they are converted to actual 
behaviour depends on the interaction of actors and the various understandings of the 
problem and possibilities for solution that develop.  
 
The second set of indicators, i.e. politics-indicators, can thus capture the conflict-laden 
processes whereby participating actors in different arenas seek to affect organisation, 
decisions and policy content. In these processes, municipal respondents are asked to 
identify the significant actors and role-expectations linked to them with reference to a 
specific policy outcome. This is already indicated above. However, it is more difficult 
to cut across the municipalities and capture the dynamics that lie behind specific choices 
of action and problem understandings. Here local variations are important; for instance, 
earlier traditions and experiences with building up relations of cooperation with external 
parties, strategic considerations among individual actors, the presence of a dialogue-
oriented or conflict-oriented culture of interactions, etc. The importance of actor 
behaviour and actors’ interaction in policy formation is best explored with a point of 
departure in the individual municipality.  
 
Some elements of actor behaviour may be traced in general, however. In this context we 
will confine ourselves to indicators concerning the interaction between the political and 
administrative level and the relations of administration to external cooperating partners, 
especially private firms. The former concern the kind of political attention and concern 
given to activation policy; the priority of activation policy on the general municipal 
policy agenda and the dimensions of activation policy, which are of special interest to 
politicians.  
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The final set of indicators are policy-indicators, which concern the more direct goals 
and policy formation in relation to the analytical dimensions of policy-alternatives and 
strategies (cf. figure 2). Among the key indicators are the kind of understandings that 
the municipalities have of the problems, the level and character of activation, the 
applied instruments, the use of demands and sanctions and the use of solutions targeting 
the individual needs of the unemployed. We expect to find a correlation between social 
disciplining and a problem understanding emphasising that the unemployed person’s 
only problem is the lack of work. The unemployment problem is then interpreted as a 
lack of will or incentive on the part of the unemployed individual. An understanding of 
the unemployed person as being incapable of taking a job would conversely point 
towards the socially integrative strategy (or social compensation strategy). The same 
goes for the application of instruments. Use of activation as a work test and public 
employment projects indicate a socially disciplining strategy, while re-qualification 
measures adapted to individual needs and individual action plans indicate a socially 
integrative strategy.  
 
Description of these policy indicators is a key part of our implementation analysis and 
requires good statistical data. Our study is based primarily on a countrywide survey. 
Respondents were heads of municipal civil service departments responsible for the 
activation and labour market area. The response rate was 72%. These data have been 
supplemented with data from the Danish national bureau of statistics. Comprehensive 
qualitative case studies were moreover carried out in five selected municipalities. This 
article is, however, primarily based upon the first set of data.  
 
Empirical findings 
 
It is not possible to provide an exhaustive description of the empirical results (cf. Larsen 
et. al 2001), but some of the most essential findings will be highlighted here. We begin 
with the policy-indicators. An important finding is how the municipalities balance 
their main labour market policy objectives.  
 
Table 1. Taking into account that activation is needs oriented and therefore may 
require different solutions in each individual case, which general objectives of 
activation do your municipality then find to be the most important?  
 Average 
Respect for the wishes and self-motivation of the individual unemployed 2,6 
Activation must be used as an (re)qualification instrument by use of education 2,8 
Demands on individual unemployed must be made and sanctions used in case of 
non-participation or absenteeism from activation  
3,1 
Activation must be a work-trial 3,5 
The life quality of the individual must be enhanced 4,3 
Local enterprises must be provided with labour 4,8 
Note: The respondent (i.e. administrative leaders of the activation/labour market departments of each 
municipality) was asked to prioritise each of the six objectives on a scale from 1-6 (1 as the most 
important and 6 as the least important objective). n=178-179. 
  
 
The findings are surprising when compared to the dominant public discourse, which 
strongly emphasise strengthening labour market orientation of municipal social policy 
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and attempts to install more disciplining elements in legislation. The ranking of 
objective shows that municipalities tend to be more oriented towards social integration 
as measured by the high ranking of self-motivation of the unemployed and re-
qualification. The social disciplining strategy (measured as demands/sanctions and 
activation as a work-trial) is seen as less important, though not wholly unimportant, as 
indicated by the fact that the passive-strategy (measured as enhancing life quality) is 
judged as least important. Activation is thereby not perceived as an unconditional public 
benefit, but the ranking of average responses, nonetheless, indicates that ‘softer’ 
objectives are more important than the ‘tougher’ objectives of the disciplining strategy. 
 
Despite the proclaimed Danish job-miracle of the late 1990s (Cox 1998; Madsen 1999; 
Torfing 1999, 2000) the numbers of social security recipients have been stagnant 
throughout the economic upswing and the character of problems of the target group for 
municipal activation may even have worsened. Municipal activation departments are 
therefore currently faced with a target group that, both quantitatively and qualitatively, 
has increased the complexity, workload and responsibility of local authorities.9 Thus, an 
explanation for the higher ranking of ‘socially integrative’ over ‘socially disciplining’ 
objectives may reflect perceptions that the problems of the target group are not 
compatible with too strong disciplining elements. On average, municipalities do not 
perceive social disciplining as a strategy to reintegrate greater numbers of social 
assistance recipients on the labour market, which is also indicated by the low ranking 
given to ‘securing labour supply for local enterprises’. This may be interpreted as an 
acknowledgement of the fact that a high proportion of the current number of social 
assistance recipients are not employable or available for the ordinary labour market, nor 
will they become so in the immediate future.      
 
Two additional observations underscore the interpretation that the immediate labour 
market availability of the target group is seen as problematic. First, despite considerable 
improvements in employment opportunities during the late 1990s, only a moderate 
decline in the total number of recipients of social assistance has been recorded. Second, 
the municipal representatives in the survey present their target groups as ‘weak’ in so 
far as 62% of current recipients of social assistance are assessed as having ‘problems 
besides unemployment’ (e.g. social, physical and health problems). The reaction of 
municipalities to the complex problem structure of the target group is to point towards 
social integration strategies rather than social disciplining strategies. These findings on 
problem definitions and general objectives also correspond to the actual policies and 
measures being implemented by the municipalities. 
 
Observing the instruments used by the municipalities to activate the target group, it is 
clear that instruments targeting the least employable and least available on the labour 
market are the most commonly applied (such as individual job-training and municipal 
employment projects). The use of educational offers is being virtually phased out at the 
moment. Ordinary job training is also used to a limited extent. The implication is that 
the private sector share of job training is reduced substantially.     
 
Examination of the data in more detail reveals major differences as to who, how much 
and how fast the unemployed are activated. The municipalities report that on average 
58% of the social assistance recipients were in activation at the time of data collection. 
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However, the register data of the Danish National Bureau of Statistics, which are 
probably more reliable than self-assessments, shows that only 33% of recipients were in 
activation in year 2000. Regardless of method of measurement, the explanation of the 
respondents for why one- to two-thirds of every social assistance recipient was not in 
activation is remarkable  
 
Table 2. What is the importance of the following explanations for the fact that 
some groups of social assistance recipient are currently not being activated? 
(average) 
It is pointless to activate some groups of unemployed (they cannot be reached) 2,9 
They unemployed abstain from activation projects 3,2 
Their case management is dragging on because of the workload 3,3 
We do not have offers that match the given target group 3,4 
The municipality lack economic resources to give relevant offers 3,8 
The unemployed reject activation 4,0 
The municipality lack formal qualifications to give relevant offers 4,0 
Note: Response categories: (1) very high importance, (2) high importance, (3) some importance, (4) less 
important and (5) no importance. n=190-194.      
 
The most frequent explanation given for non-activation is that activation is perceived as 
pointless for certain groups. They cannot be reached! This finding shows that there is a 
large group of unemployed for whom activation is not seen as a relevant or meaningful 
option. It may be an indication that there has emerged a gap between legislative and 
political intentions on the one side and the composition of the target group of 
unemployed on the other side. The municipal reaction to this gap is to ‘free’ a 
proportion of the unemployed from the ‘burden’ of activation. 
 
The correspondence between local policies, measures and the problem character of the 
target group is reflected in the fact that young and ‘employable’ persons whose only 
problem is unemployment are activated first. It may of course also reflect ‘creaming’ in 
so far as the strongest unemployed are prioritised in order to achieve better and quicker 
results. It is also the ‘most employable’ who are sanctioned most severely, which is also 
the legislative intention. 
 
The empirical findings on the administrative/organisational indicators support this 
portrait of municipal implementation going in the direction of social integration: In 
general there are only few major organisational changes, where we had an assumption 
that a shift in the direction of NPM-style organisational forms would correspond with 
the socially disciplining strategy. Concerning shifting public responsibilities for 
municipal activation towards the private sector, the findings of the study are surprising, 
in so far as municipalities still consider activation as a ‘pure’ public responsibility. 
Hence, only 3% of municipalities currently use contracting-out (in open tenders) and 
only 5% are planning to do so. Compared to the intentions of political decision-makers 
and the persistent media-debate, is must be interpreted as a relatively low level. 
 
NPM-inspired developments in administration policy have nonetheless spread to 
municipal authorities and spilled over into the labour market policy area. In relation to 
accountability-processes and control, however, fundamental changes cannot be 
observed. Even if there is a new focus on target formulation, supervision and evaluation 
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of output, the operational consequences of such new systems at the field level, 
observable in related municipal policy areas, do not seem to have had the same effect in 
the area of activation policy. There is still a large element of street-level autonomy and 
discretion in the implementation of activation policies. This is probably due to the 
special character of the policy field in which problem identification among 
municipalities still varies and the choice of activation instruments must correspond to 
individual and local circumstances. Activation is a dynamic-interventionist policy type 
(cf. Rothstein 1998) and will therefore be exceptionally difficult to standardise. Skilled 
street-level caseworkers, moreover, strongly resist breaking down performance 
measures to the individual level. 
 
The complex problems of the target group are reflected in the organisation of municipal 
activation. Caseworkers continue to enjoy a relatively high degree of autonomy and 
discretion in deciding which measures correspond to individual demands and 
requirements. Our empirical data point towards a ‘traditional’ organisation of municipal 
activation characterised by limited standardisation and high street-level autonomy. 
Municipalities still organise daily work routines according to broadly defined 
professional competencies and orientations in which the general knowledge and 
experiences of individual caseworkers is the key factor in identifying solutions to 
specific problem situation. The traditional work organisation, what in the social policy 
discourses of the 1970s would be labelled ‘holistic and individualised work 
organisation’, still permeates municipal activation. Despite public discussions about 
reducing the discretionary powers of caseworkers and introducing new types of 
occupational groups in municipal activation (allegedly more knowledgeable about the 
realities of the ordinary labour market), the composition of personnel remains 
dominated by academically trained social workers and caseworkers with on the job 
training (‘socialrådgivere’ and ‘socialformidlere’). New types of occupational groups, 
however, are in some municipalities hired to take charge of contacts with private 
enterprises. The only exception to the rule that caseworkers enjoy autonomy in daily 
activities is in areas with major economic consequences for the municipalities.    
In sum, modern organisational principles and models have not yet led to fundamental 
changes or ‘revolutions’ in internal organisation of municipal activation departments. 
Of course our survey suffers from the methodological limitation that it presents only a 
cross-sectional image of the situation in April 2001 and does not allow us to describe 
historical changes. Our data could also be interpreted as indication of developments 
being set gradually in motion compared to previous organisational practices. 
Nevertheless, our qualitative case studies also seem to confirm that fundamental 
changes have not occurred. 
 
There thus seems to be accordance between the policy and administrative/organisational 
indicators. It becomes increasingly difficult to standardise organisation and work 
routines and to identify measurable objectives as policy shifts towards the social 
integration approach (or even exemption from activation). Discretion and professional 
decision-making autonomy appear to be more viable methods of work organisation. In 
this respect, internal organisation reflects problem definitions and the policy content of 
municipal authorities. It does not imply ‘status quo’ in internal organisation but, rather, 
that the changes are incremental and step-wise and take into account traditional 
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orientations and the character of the target group. However, more fundamental changes 
can possibly be detected in the external organisation of municipal authorities. 
 
The active-line (with self-sufficiency as the end goal) and reorientation towards the 
ordinary labour market has clearly affected perceptions of the inter-organisational 
relationships of municipal activation departments. The aim, on the one hand, is to 
reintegrate the proportionally lower share of ‘immediately employable’ on the ordinary 
labour market and, on the other hand, to prevent further exclusion from the labour 
market. The dominant municipal activity is clearly to target social integration towards 
the ordinary labour market. By implication, there is a strong orientation in nearly every 
municipality towards greater involvement of private enterprises in activation. Political 
and administrative decisions are taken, initiatives towards the private sector are 
implemented, and groups of employees are hired to cater for the contact with private 
enterprises. The greater focus on involvement of private enterprises is also reflected in 
the fact that municipalities in general find that the influence of employers’ associations 
in municipal activation activities should be improved. 
 
Conflicts of interest, however, are still alive as seen in the motives that municipal 
administrators are giving the social partners for involving themselves in co-operation on 
active social policy. Municipal respondents have difficulties identifying the ‘ownership’ 
of social partners towards social policies; motivations for co-operation are more related 
to narrow organisational interests. The municipal respondents assess the employers’ 
associations to be motivated predominantly by concerns for maintaining and retaining 
persons already in employment (i.e. internal social responsibility) and by measures 
related to raising the supply of labour. Labour unions are said to be motivated for co-
operation by the opportunity to retain members already in ordinary employment. 
Converted into policy programmes, prevention of workplace exclusion and actively 
retaining employees who risk exclusion (internal social responsibility) seems favourable 
fields for cooperation. Finding common interests for measures to achieve social 
integration of social assistance recipients outside the labour market seems more difficult 
(external social responsibility). However, when these motives are seen in the light of 
our analysis of target group characteristics and favoured objectives for activation, it 
should be noted that it seems to be in the field of social integration that municipalities 
may be most in need of integrated co-operation with social partners.  
 
In sum, our data indicate that municipal activation policy should still be described as a 
predominantly local government responsibility despite municipal attempts to intensify 
cooperation with especially the social partners. Social integration of target groups on the 
ordinary labour market remains the overriding objective of municipal activation 
departments, and conflicts of interests with the social partners can still be identified. 
 
The implemented policy-content (step 3) 
 
Summing up the findings from the analysis of the indicators, we can now move to the 
third step in the approach and characterize the implemented policy content. Our general 
conclusions about the implemented policy content are summarised in the figure below  
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Figure 5. The implemented ‘active-line’ 
Active-line Passive-line 
Social 
disciplining 
Social 
Integration 
Non-participation 
in activation 
Social 
compensation 
Labour 
market 
available and 
immediately 
employable 
Available for activation 
and employable in longer-
term perspective 
‘Unreachable’ within the 
active-line 
Pre-pensioners 
                           
 
The dominant political discourse in Denmark reflected in a number of legislative and 
administrative initiatives focus on social disciplining measures. However, in municipal 
implementation the disciplining policy elements are toned down. This is illustrated in 
the figure by reducing the width of the column ‘social disciplining’ (compare to figure 
2). In dealing with those persons assessed to be immediately available to the labour 
market, however, municipalities are pushing hard with social disciplining strategies 
(work first, activation as work test and strict sanctions). For the remaining – and much 
larger – target group, social integration is used. Municipal authorities, finally, assess 
that a high share of the least employable cannot be reached within the ‘active-line’ as 
long as self-sufficiency is the end goal. This is illustrated in the figure by the group of 
‘unreachable’ falling outside the grey area of the ‘active-line’. 
 
Evaluation (step 4) 
 
As indicated in the analytical approach (figure 1), the characterisation of policy content 
can finally be applied to evaluation. We thus compare empirical findings of the 
implementation analysis with more normative judgement based on different evaluation 
criteria.  
 
Evaluation has traditionally meant being able to provide policy advice to political 
decision-makers. This understanding has led Scandinavia’s leading evaluation 
researcher, Evert Vedung, to restrict evaluation to only occupying itself with the 
implementation process (even though he prefers terms other than implementation). 
Vedung (1991) argue that it is problematic to evaluate the decision-making process that 
the analyst must subsequently be a policy advisor to. In contrast we evaluate all parts of 
the policy-making process and view the advisor role as significantly broader. The 
argument for doing so is, first, that if policy analysis shall approach its original 
ambitions of becoming ‘the policy science of democracy” (Lasswell 1951), i.e. create 
knowledge for improvement of democratic practice, then the subject of analysis must 
include all aspects of the political process. Second, if policy analysis shall become more 
than a technocratic instrument for the political elite, then the advisory role must be 
defined in relation to a broader groups of stakeholders and the general public.  
 
Thus our approach is more in line with post-positivist evaluation research (e.g., Fischer 
1995), in using different lenses (or evaluation criteria) covering what Fischer calls ‘first 
order’ to ‘second order’ evaluation, cf. the above mentioned questions being posed. 
Critics have suggested that such a perspective and analytical approach to evaluation 
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presents a formidable challenge to the researcher. The approach nonetheless point 
towards discussions of a new role definition for evaluation, which should not be easily 
abandoned. First, the standard of evaluation is no longer only a question of whether 
political objectives have been realised in implementation, but equally important whether 
the stated political objectives are ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in themselves. Second, research 
findings are not only addressed to authoritative decision-makers but to the general 
public. In the literature about different perspectives of evaluation these are sometimes 
seen as conflicting. We do not take the same view. It is the explicit use of more 
perspectives, which makes it possible to differentiate knowledge from the evaluation 
according to the ‘stakeholders’ one wants to enter into a dialogue with. The evaluation 
criteria we utilise below are efficiency, effectiveness, adequacy (causal relations), 
responsiveness, equity and appropriateness (Dunn 1995, 282ff.). In this respect we 
move from ‘first-order’ to ‘second-order’ evaluation by applying different lenses to the 
empirical findings of the study.  
 
Evaluation of efficiency and effectiveness 
Efficiency and effectiveness are closely related to technical and economic rationality. 
Effectiveness refers to whether a given alternative results in the achievement of a valued 
outcome (often measured in terms of products or services), whereas efficiency refers to 
the amount or level of inputs required to produce a given level of effectiveness (often 
measured in terms of monetary costs). In our study of municipal activation policies in 
Denmark, the characterisation of the policy content was not evaluated on the basis of 
policy effectiveness and efficiency. Our limited database prevented us from making 
such as assessment, due to lack of individual participant data. Nevertheless, it is still 
fruitful to apply the perspective of efficiency and effectiveness to our findings. What 
kind of evaluation results would this entail? 
  
The conclusion would undoubtedly be quite negative. In summary form, the 
municipalities do not seem to fulfil their legislative obligations to activate all those who 
are unemployed. This is also the case with the disciplining elements of the legislation. 
Here the municipalities must be assessed as being ‘too soft’. There are also limited 
short-term effects in relation to objectives of improving employment and self-
sufficiency of the target groups. The fact that the target group has numerous problems 
besides unemployment seems irrelevant in this respect. In this evaluation perspective 
municipal activation is too expensive and inefficient. Such findings based on technical 
and economic rationality undoubtedly has the greatest impact on the dominant political 
decision-makers and mirrors the findings of especially economic research (cf. Danish 
Economic Council 2002; Calmfors 1994; Martin 2000).  
 
Evaluation of adequacy 
The criterion of ‘adequacy’ specifies expectations about the strength of a relationship 
between policy alternatives and valued outcomes, and it is in this sense that the criteria 
is applied here.10 In our analysis, policy alternatives are presented around social 
disciplining and social integration. Social disciplining, as mentioned, is the dominant 
political discourse in Denmark in legislative and administrative initiatives. However, 
this strategy is relevant for only a limited proportion of the unemployed. The 
discrepancy is clearly reflected in municipal implementation in which disciplining 
policy elements are toned down. Apparently, the disciplining strategy does not match a 
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high proportion of the target group. The group of ‘weak’ unemployed (with least 
employability and/or limited labour market availability) can probably not be pushed 
onto the ordinary labour market using enforcement measures and sanctions. As a policy 
instrument, this ‘stick’ is only effective towards a minority of the currently unemployed. 
Social integration seems to be a more adequate policy alternative, with more 
individualised measures and instruments in greater harmony with the capacities and 
needs of the individual unemployed and in which self-motivation is a driving 
mechanism. Recognition of this fact is one of the cornerstones of the current processes 
of implementation of activation in the municipalities. Nevertheless, even social 
integration seems to have its limits. There is a large group of unemployed for which 
activation is neither relevant nor effective. This may be an indication that Danish 
activation policy has reached a threshold in which official policy objectives do not meet 
the characteristics of the target group. Available instruments in the ‘active-line’ are all 
targeted towards gaining ordinary employment and self-sufficiency but apparently not 
targeted towards the needs of this target group. The municipal reaction to the 
discrepancy is to exempt a proportion of the unemployed from the ‘burden’ of 
activation. But this strategy also becomes a problem, in any case if one uses another 
‘lens’ and goes further to the next evaluation criterion. 
 
Evaluation of responsiveness 
‘Responsiveness’ refers to the extent to which a policy satisfies the needs, preferences, 
or values of particular groups. Responsiveness entails a relationship to the actual needs 
of groups that are supposed to benefit from a policy. In this evaluation perspective, one 
would compare our findings to actual (micro) studies of the target groups’ reactions and 
experiences of the interventions. We have not done this,11 but there are nevertheless 
numerous indications that the various strategies of the municipalities correspond to the 
capacities and problems of the target groups. And with this evaluation criterion, the 
interventions can be assessed in a more positive light. There is much evidence to 
indicate that the municipalities to a great extent structure their interventions according 
to the target groups with whom they are dealing, rather than slavishly implementing the 
legally mandated political objectives around a more disciplining line. Here the 
municipalities assess that the ‘stick’ is of no use in returning large proportions of the 
target groups to the ordinary labour market. Instead, they emphasise social integration 
measures, which seem more in accord with the real needs of the target groups. 
However, there is a still large segment of the target group for which this strategy has no 
relevance. And here the evaluation reveals a more negative result in relation to the 
responsiveness criterion, since alternative interventions are not offered. This groups 
outside the active-line is in effect abandoned as a ever increasing gap emerge between 
the official intentions of the ’active-line’ and the realities on the ground.  
 
Evaluation of equity 
The criterion of ‘equity’ is closely related to legal and social rationality, and refers to 
the distribution of effects and efforts among different groups in society. With this 
perspective we begin moving from the specific program to broader social and political 
values (higher-order criteria). Equity refers to a policy where effects or efforts are fairly 
or justly distributed.12 In this perspective, it becomes problematic when a municipality 
exempts a proportion of the unemployed from the ‘burden’ of activation. This is not 
only a violation of official policy objectives. It also seems to require a political 
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discussion on whether and how this group should be included in the traditional quid pro 
quo work obligation. The municipalities can select one of two strategies. The first 
strategy is to activate the group (primarily by individual job training or municipal 
employment projects) knowing that the probability of success is very limited and that 
individuals may experience (yet another) personal defeat. The second strategy is to 
accept the fact that not each and every unemployed can or should participate in 
activation in return for benefits. That strategy may however mask the legitimate needs 
and demands of this group for another type of targeted social intervention than 
activation.  
 
A cause for concern in this perspective is thus the relatively large group of unemployed 
whom the municipalities have placed outside the activation policy. The key questions 
must be: What is the solution for this group? How ‘passive’ is this unofficial ‘passive-
line’? Does exemption from activation imply that these persons are compensated only 
via unconditional transfer income, or are more traditional social policy measures being 
applied (e.g., professional counselling, medical, psychological, physical treatment, 
etc.)? Is the alternative for this group - in the ‘twilight zone’ between the officially 
sanctioned active and passive lines - only to gain eligibility to enter the pre-pension 
scheme, or is it necessary to develop new types of (empowerment) instruments, which 
do not necessarily have economic self-sufficiency as their ultimate goal? 
 
Evaluation of appropriateness 
‘Appropriateness’ refers to the value or worth of a program’s objectives and to the 
tenability of the assumptions underlying these objectives. While all other criteria take 
objectives for granted, the criterion of appropriateness asks whether these criteria are 
the proper ones for society. To answer this question, the analyst must consider all 
criteria together and seek to identify the societal values that the program builds upon 
(Dunn 1995; Fischer 1995). The criterion of appropriateness is therefore also 
necessarily open-ended, since by definition it is not intended to go beyond any set of 
existing criteria. 
 
In Denmark, there is a general legitimacy surrounding activation as an instrument to 
ensure an adequate supply of jobs, and as a means of ensuring a higher degree of 
welfare to the unemployed individual. There is also a broad acceptance of activation 
(and sanctions) as a means of increasing the individual’s incentive to seek work, 
simultaneously with a concern to increase the individual unemployed person’s 
qualifications. The intervention must be of the kind that the individual can and will be 
able to work. In recent years, however, there has occurred a distortion toward applying 
activation to increasing the individual’s incentives to seek work rather than focusing on 
the lack of qualifications. And here policymakers can show themselves to be entirely 
out of step with the reality in which the intervention must be implemented. This is what 
our implementation analysis reveals. And therefore, it is perhaps not so surprising that 
several official evaluations find high costs of activation and a lack of immediate results. 
The question, then, is which political consequences should be drawn from this? The 
most recent answers have been a reduction of activation inputs (especially the 
qualification elements from the social integration strategy) and even more emphasis on 
the disciplining elements. As a result, however, even more groups might not be covered 
by the legitimised ‘active-line’ and loose contact to the labour market. Instead, there 
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seems to be need for policy developments that more appropriately corresponds to the 
needs of the target group. And it seems not only to concern lack of will among the 
unemployed, but even more the question of job-related and personal (re-)qualification 
within a social integration strategy. 
 
In addition, there is the question of the large group of unemployed who are legally 
subject to activation, but whom the municipalities do not regard as worth the activation 
effort. This group finds itself in a vacuum, judged too healthy to qualify for disability 
pensions, but not sufficient qualified for an activation effort. On the basis of fairness 
considerations alone, this is entirely unacceptable.  
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
We have presented an alternative approach to the analysis of implementation processes 
and suggested subsequent alternative forms of evaluation. The model has been 
presented by an implementation study of activation policy in the Danish municipalities. 
In our view there is a great need for empirically founded implementation studies 
followed by more normatively founded evaluation. Especially in relation to the latter, 
there seems to be a need for a greater range of evaluation criteria than those most 
frequently employed, where focus is on goal fulfilment in relation to narrow 
understandings of effectiveness and efficiency. This is clearly illustrated in the case of 
activation policy. 
 
Moreover, it is our impression that the approach presented here has relevance beyond 
this study of active labour market policy. Particularly in relation to public policies 
targeting ‘wicked’ problems (i.e. probably the majority of policy problems and certainly 
the most important problems) and where the level of ambitions for change of target 
group behaviour is high (i.e. human processing policies). In these cases causal 
knowledge will often be uncertain or even unavailable, and this calls for ‘opening up’ 
evaluation strategies in order to cover a wide range of evaluation perspectives. Different 
lenses produce different knowledge and that is to acknowledge for both policy-makers, 
different ‘stakeholders’ and the public in general that learning, experimentation and 
evaluation are important elements of the implementation process. Choosing a single 
perspective will miss this point. This frame of understanding would also correspond 
better to the increasing tendency towards implementation of public policies in intra- and 
inter-organisational networks where a multitude of different central and local as well as 
public and private organisations have a stake in policy implementation. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 In the literature there are different uses of the notion ‘outcome’. Our understanding refers to observed 
consequences of policy actions. It also means that something follow after outcome, e.g. policy 
performance in relation to assessing the degree to which a given policy outcome contributes to the 
attainment of desired values. Others use ‘output’ or ‘outcome’ to denote such a distinction. 
2 This part is often categorized under ‘studies of policy content’ (Hogwood and Gunn 1984, p. 29). 
3 The case on municipal implementation of labour market policy originates from our project ’The role of 
local authorities in active labour market policy’ (Kommunerne i arbejdsmarkedspolitikken). The project is 
financed by the Danish Research Council under the auspices of the Center for Labour Market Research 
(CARMA) at Aalborg University, Denmark. 
4 In stressing the importance of studying what happens, we are in line with the ‘bottom up’ perspective in 
implementation research, i.e. the actual behaviour and actions of implementing agents and organisations 
in the policy field is essentially more important than official political objectives and intentions (cf. Lipsky 
1980; Hjern and Porter 1981; Hjern 1982, Hjern and Hull 1982). Our essential reservation concerning the 
‘bottom up’ perspective is, however, that in studying actual behavior and actions at the bottom of the 
implementation structure one also needs to consider how the official and explicit goals influence the 
actions and operations of the organizations and actors in charge of implementing the policy. 
5 In choosing these dimensions for investigation we build upon prior knowledge or ‘theory’ of the specific 
circumstances of the delivery of human processing programmes. In the sense our approach is ‘theory 
driven’ (Pawson and Tilley 1997 p.25ff) 
6 ‘Wicked problems’ cannot be clearly defined and are difficult to separate them from other problems. 
The goals for their solutions are ill defined and due to this there are no clear criterion for the optimal 
solution. There will only be a ‘best’ solution and this ‘best’ solution will always be a normative one. 
7 A few contextual remarks on labour market policy and the role of the Danish municipalities may be in 
order. Danish central-local relations are among the most decentralised in the western world both in terms 
of expenditures and service delivery. Constitutionally, municipalities have a high degree of autonomy 
from central authorities. The popularly elected municipal councils may write out their own taxes to 
finance local welfare services. Since 1978, municipalities have also obtained a central position in labour 
market policy. Municipalities are responsible for different types of employment and activation measures 
and for paying out income transfers to unemployed without unemployment insurance. They even 
participate in activation of unemployed with insurance, even if the public employment service has the 
final responsibility for these measures.  
8 However, reductions of benefit levels were not politically feasible in the early 1990s. 
9 Denmark experienced from 1995-2001, according to some observes, an employment miracle, as official 
unemployment rates more than halved, as youth unemployment virtually disappeared and long-term 
unemployment fell dramatically. At the same time inflation rates remained comparatively low and 
economic growth high. However, the improving labour market situation primarily benefited persons in 
the public employment service system, the majority of which were readily available for the ordinary 
labour market. The majority of those unemployed not benefiting from the economic upswing are located 
in the social security system and are characterised as having ‘problems besides unemployment’ (e.g. 
social, physical or health problems). 
10 And not (as with Dunn 1995) to only assess costs in relation to effectiveness. We evaluate the adequacy 
of the implemented active-line relation to the problem situation. 
11 Subjective effect measurements of participant satisfaction with activation have generally shown a 
surprisingly high level of satisfaction with the quality and effects of activation offers (cf. e.g. Hansen 
2001), which seem contradictory to the pessimistic employment effects found in micro-effect and 
variation evaluations (cf. Danish Economic Council 2002; Albreckt 2002) 
12 This evaluation criterion is (like the criterion of ’appropriateness’) in no way unambiguous, as there 
will be competing conceptions of justice or fairness and the appropriate basis of distributing resources in 
society. A more extensive discussion of this issue, however, lies beyond the framework of this article (see 
Dunn 1995). 
